

22 February 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer for the USSR  
and Eastern Europe

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: SALT III ☐

1. Appreciate your memo on SALT III and the good work that is going on with ☐ I look forward to seeing the rough of ☐ work any day now. ☐

2. I read George Seignious' think piece for the President on where to go in SALT III. It is a good start and I am glad to see ACDA is moving out. At the same time, the assumption, it seems to me, behind George's paper is to achieve the practical. He approaches the question of what to attempt in SALT III on the basis of what is likely to be achievable. I hope we will look at the question from the point of view of what are the Soviet objectives; what should our objectives be; and then what, if anything, is achievable. ☐

3. With ☐ work we'll have something on our estimate of the Soviet objectives. I think we should then take our own hand at what U.S. objectives should be. This may sound like a policy issue but it really takes experts like Howie Stoertz to tell how the United States might benefit by the imposition of restrictions on strategic weapons. Would we be better off with less Soviet throw weight, warheads, accuracy, etc., is not something that comes easily. ☐


SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/03/01 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003300290012-6

25X1

4. I know we are all pushed with other SALT matters. Let's look at [ ]'s paper and then perhaps have an hour's bull session on U.S. objectives and how we go from there to a SALT III. [ ]

25X1

  
STANSFIELD TURNER

25X1

cc: DDNFA  
NIO/SP





Approved For Release 2005/03/01 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003300290012-6